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RECAP; State of Montana v. James Morris Colburn: When the Sole
Defense is Precluded by Montana’s Rape Shield Law
Caitlin S. Williams
No. DA 14-0181 Montana Supreme Court
Oral Argument: Wednesday, December 2, 2015 at 9:30 AM in the
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice
Building, Helena, Montana.
I. SUMMARY
At oral argument, the main subject of debate was whether the
defendant appellant, James Morris Colburn, was prevented from
exercising his constitutional right to a defense by the trial court’s
application of Montana’s rape shield statute. The defendant argued for
the implementation of a procedure to balance the constitutional rights of
the accused against the public policy implications underlying the rape
shield statute when considering what evidence the accused can offer.
Specifically, the defendant asserted that he was unable to raise a
complete defense by not being able to introduce (1) evidence of a
possible alternative source for the victim’s sexual knowledge, and (2)
evidence of a possible motive for the victim to fabricate her allegations.
The exclusion of that evidence and the underlying constitutional
implications are the basis of this appeal.
II. MS. JENNIFER HURLEY FOR THE DEFENDANT
Ms. Hurley commenced her argument by asserting the district
court should have considered implementing a balancing test of the
parties’ interests. Facing questions regarding whether she agreed that the
rape shield is designed to protect victims, and that allowing evidence of
sexualization to be introduced could re-traumatize the young victims the
statute is designed to protect. Ms. Hurley agreed with that concern, but
argued that by conducting a balancing test, the trial court can determine
at its discretion the extent the details are necessary to avoid
retraumatization.
The Court then challenged Ms. Hurley on the matter of timing:
whether or not the evidence of sexualization has to be first presented by
the State before the defendant can present it. After acknowledging that
this specific issue has not been litigated in Montana, Ms. Hurley
identified that while the State relied heavily on R.W.’s sexual knowledge
and the subsequent inference she could only have that knowledge if she
was abused by the defendant, the defendant was not allowed to rebut that
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inference by introducing evidence of a possible alternative source of that
knowledge. The argument then shifted to whether the State “opened the
door” with that argument, and whether it was fair to argue that in doing
so waived the application of the rape shield.
In examining the proposed balancing test, the Court questioned
Hurley on the distinction between the victim’s credibility versus her
reputation and character. Specifically, evidence of credibility is
potentially admissible, while evidence of the victim’s reputation and
character is barred under the rape shield. Ms. Hurley responded that
while the State argues that the defendant did not offer sufficient evidence
that the alleged abuse R.W. sustained by her father was relevant, the
defense was actually not able to make an offer of proof in that respect.
The defense sought to offer a forensic interview report where R.W.
disclosed the abuse by her father and drew several depictions of the
abuse. Ms. Hurley argued that the district court should have assessed to
what extent the details of the father’s abuse were necessary, and at the
very least that the defendant should have been able to rebut the inference
that R.W. could only have the sexual knowledge she did if she had been
abused by the defendant.
Ms. Hurley concluded her opening argument by proposing the
procedure utilized in State ex rel. Mazurek v. District Court,1 where a
balancing test was implemented when the defendant sought to introduce
the victim’s alleged prior false accusations of sexual abuse.2 Ms. Hurley
advocated for a similar balancing test to be applied on remand in the
instant case, where the defendant could give notice of his intent to
introduce evidence of prior sexual abuse and explain its relevance to a
material issue in this case. She further stated that there should then be a
hearing outside of the presence of a jury where the Court could conduct
the balancing test and “determine the extent and form of the evidence.”
III. MR. MARK FOWLER FOR THE STATE OF MONTANA
The State commenced its argument with the assertion that the
defendant failed to offer sufficient proof as to the relevancy of the abuse
R.W. sustained by her father. Furthermore, the State attacked the
admissibility of the forensic interview the defense sought to introduce,
claiming that it is double hearsay and the defendant had multiple
opportunities to have a hearing on that evidence but declined to do so.
The Court quickly pointed out that there is a statement in that forensic
report (referencing R.W.’s disclosure about the abuse by her father) that
is “devastating” to the State as it concerns exactly what the defense is
arguing––an alternative source of sexual knowledge. Mr. Fowler
1
2

State ex. rel. Mazurek v. District Court, 922 P.2d 474 (Mont. 1996).
Id. at 480.
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countered that the Court is not permitted under the Constitution to admit
irrelevant evidence, regardless of whether or not the State opened the
door. Focusing on that specific point, the Court asked if Mr. Fowler
really considered evidence of an alternative source of sexual knowledge
as irrelevant in a child rape case. Mr. Fowler argued that it was not
relevant because the defense never demonstrated the nexus between the
incidents of sexual abuse R.W. sustained from her father and from the
defendant, to which the Court pointed out the defendant was precluded
from raising that defense.
Mr. Fowler next argued the forensic interview report was not
even introduced to the trial judge until after the jury verdict was
delivered, despite ample opportunities to introduce it earlier. He posited
that the defense likely waited to introduce the report for strategic
reasons: the defense recognized that the incidents of sexual abuse are two
totally separate acts and likely feared the relevancy challenge. The Court
was again skeptical of that theory, and pushed Mr. Fowler on his stance
that the jury should not have been able to hear about a possible
alternative source of R.W.’s sexual knowledge. Mr. Fowler conceded
that the evidence was only marginally relevant, because R.W. was able to
distinguish between the two incidents of sexual assault.
The Court then considered the reasoning behind excluding the
details the attacks have in common and allowing the jury to subsequently
conclude that R.W. possessed sexual knowledge only from the attack by
the defendant. Mr. Fowler responded by stressing the important public
policy implications underlying the rape shield, including the risk of
confusing or misleading the jury and violating the victim’s privacy. The
Court then pointed out that there were many details specific to the
alleged attack by the defendant that were not shared by the alleged attack
by the father, and the State could have introduced that evidence without
“opening the door” to the source of R.W.’s sexual knowledge.
The Court further questioned the State’s position on Ms.
Hurley’s proposed use of the balancing test under Mazurek. Mr. Fowler
argued that the instant case is distinguishable from Mazurek in that there
was no proffered evidence that R.W. fabricated her allegations, while
there was evidence of fabrication in Mazurek. The Court then countered
that the fabrication was not the point, but rather the admissibility of such
evidence, to which the State argued that it was incumbent on defense
counsel to proffer that evidence.
The State concluded its argument by pointing out that the
prosecutor instructed the jury to make its determination of the
defendant’s guilt based on R.W.’s in-court testimony, and therefore any
error the trial court may have made in excluding evidence was harmless.
IV. HURLEY REBUTTAL BY MS. HURLEY
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Before Ms. Hurley began to rebut the State’s arguments, she was
asked by the Court for a statement of the rule regarding the exception to
the rape shield that she proposes under the Constitution. Ms. Hurley
responded by stating that while there is no plain rule statement that can
be applied, even if the State doesn’t make the inference explicit (namely,
the inference that R.W. could only possess this sexual knowledge if she
had been abused by the defendant), it would still naturally be inferred by
a jury, which is sufficient on its own to violate the defendant’s
constitutional rights. Therefore, the Court should implement a balancing
test to allow the defendant to rebut that inference.
Regarding the State’s argument that the defense did not make a
sufficient offer of proof regarding the relevance of the abuse R.W.
sustained by her father, Ms. Hurley strongly denied that assertion and
stated the District Court had a copy of the forensic interview where that
information was disclosed, it was a proposed exhibit, and it was cited to
in the defendant’s motion in limine. The final question from the Court
was whether the defense objected to the testimony of Nurse Hanson on
direct examination, to which Ms. Hurley said that the testimony was not
objectionable under the rules of evidence, and yet the defendant did not
have an opportunity to rebut that testimony either.
V. PREDICTIONS
The fact that the Justices asked much more critical questions of
the State than of the defendant suggests that this will not be an open-andshut case. The defendant faced an uphill battle going into oral argument
considering the unpleasant nature of the accusations against him and the
potential consequences of loosening the standards surrounding the rape
shield. However, the Court appeared far more skeptical of the State’s
apparent willingness to completely dismiss the defendant’s constitutional
right to raise a defense. There is a very real possibility that the appellant
could be successful in having this case remanded with instruction that
allows him to introduce certain evidence, but regardless of which way
the Court rules, this case will have far-reaching implications on the
future litigation of child rape cases.

